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CAN STREUMER SIMPLY AVOID 
SUPERVENIENCE?
Luke Elson
art Streumer has recently defended an error theory for all normative 
claims.1 Streumer’s argument is by elimination: he offers original argu-
ments against all competing metaethical views. A major such competitor 
is non-reductive realism about the normative. This view holds that there are ir-
reducibly normative properties that are not identical to natural or descriptive 
properties.
To see Streumer’s argument against non-reductive realism, first consider 
Frank Jackson’s famous reduction argument against that view. Jackson’s argu-
ment depends on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive:
S: For all possible worlds w and w*, if the instantiation of descriptive prop-
erties in w and w* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative 
properties in w and w* is also exactly the same.2
Jackson’s main idea is this: given a normative predicate such as “is wrong,” the 
truth of supervenience allows us to construct a highly artificial descriptive pred-
icate that is necessarily co-extensive with the normative predicate.3
Now, consider the following criterion of property identity:
N: Two predicates ascribe the same property iff they are necessarily co-
extensive.4
If this criterion is correct, then the normative predicate and its artificial descrip-
tive counterpart ascribe the same property. This implies that non-reductive re-
alism is false, at least assuming that the “shared” property is a descriptive one.
There are obviously many places to object to this argument. For example, 
1 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors.
2 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 25.
3 Jackson, “From Metaphysics to Ethics,” 122–23.
4 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 30.
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one might object to the distinction between normative and descriptive predi-
cates, or to the criterion of property identity N.
One of its (apparently) less controversial aspects is the supervenience claim 
S. But S has recently been questioned.5 Streumer offers a new version of the re-
duction argument that putatively “does not appeal to any claim about superve-
nience at all.”6
If Streumer’s version of the reduction argument indeed avoids appeal to su-
pervenience, then this is significant even for non-error theorists. Most obviously, 
it would add to the stock of arguments against non-reductive realism, and re-
duce their dependence on S. Critics of non-reductive realism (including both 
error theorists and other brands of realist) should welcome a new argument 
against that view, especially one that relies on weaker assumptions.
In this article, however, I will argue that Streumer’s argument indeed relies 
on supervenience. The dependence is more opaque than in Jackson’s version of 
the argument, but without S, the argument fails.7
1. Streumer’s Simple Moral Theory Argument
To get the argument going, we first assume that some simple moral theory is 
correct.8 By way of example, take hedonistic act utilitarianism:
Utilitarianism: Necessarily, an action is right if and only if it maximizes 
happiness.9
Since “maximizes happiness” is a descriptive predicate, Utilitarianism says that 
“is right” is co-extensive with a descriptive predicate (“maximizes happiness”), 
and that this co-extension holds across all possible worlds. In other words, Util-
itarianism implies:
5 For discussion and references, see Väyrynen, “The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Natu-
ralism.”
6 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 26, 30–35. An earlier version appeared in Streumer, “Why 
There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties,” 315–18.
7 Dunaway also discusses reduction without supervenience (“Supervenience Arguments and 
Normative Non-Naturalism”). I will not consider his view here, because I am evaluating 
whether Streumer’s argument is a distinctive supervenience-avoiding refutation of non-re-
ductive realism.
8 The normative property in question throughout is that of moral rightness, but the argument 
is intended to extend to all normative properties.
9 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 30.
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Right-Description Necessity: The predicate “is right” is necessarily co-ex-
tensive with a descriptive predicate.10
Now, applying N, Right-Description Necessity in turn implies that rightness and 
a descriptive property (in this case, maximizing happiness) are the same proper-
ty. So non-reductive realism is false.
We reached this conclusion by assuming that the correct moral theory is sim-
ple, and that it is Utilitarianism. But the conclusion would not be very interesting 
if it relied on these assumptions. So Streumer appeals to the following principle:
W: Whether normative properties are identical to descriptive properties 
cannot depend on which first-order normative view is correct.11
If W is true, then nothing hung on the truth of Utilitarianism, or more gener-
ally on the truth of a simple first-order moral view. So the assumptions can be 
dropped, but the conclusion—that non-reductive realism is false—stands.
The supervenience claim S did not explicitly feature in this argument. But, I 
will argue, the argument nevertheless depends on S: its conclusion applies only 
to moral theories that imply the truth of supervenience. In particular, the modal 
operator “necessarily” in Utilitarianism smuggles in the supervenience claim.
2. Reduction-Friendly Theories
The heart of my criticism is this: Right-Description Necessity amounts to super-
venience, and the argument succeeds only for that restricted set of first-order 
moral theories that entails Right-Description Necessity. Therefore, the argu-
ment covertly relies on S.
Utilitarianism has the following structure: necessarily, an act x is right iff φ(x), 
where φ is a descriptive predicate. In other words, Utilitarianism ascribes a nec-
essary and sufficient condition φ for rightness, where φ is descriptive, and says 
that this biconditional holds necessarily. Call first-order moral theories with this 
structure “reduction friendly.” 
Clearly, any reduction-friendly moral theory implies Right-Description Ne-
cessity. But Right-Description Necessity entails supervenience. To see this, sup-
pose that two worlds w and w* are such that all descriptive properties are the 
same. φ is a descriptive property, so the same acts are φ in w and w*. Therefore, 
10 As Streumer puts it: “If [Utilitarianism] is correct, the predicate ‘is right’ is necessarily co-
extensive with the descriptive predicate ‘maximizes happiness’” (Unbelievable Errors, 31). I 
take this—and the other necessity claims in play—to involve a kind of metaphysical neces-
sity: moral theories that violate it are not logically incoherent.
11 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 31.
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and applying our reduction-friendly theory of the normative property in ques-
tion, the same acts have that normative property in w and w*. But this is just a 
statement of S.
So Streumer’s chosen example happens to be one that implies supervenience. 
But could his argument instead work with some other simple moral theory—
one that does not imply S?
To see why not, consider some other putative moral theories. These exam-
ples show that a moral theory that is not reduction friendly either fails to entail 
Right-Description Necessity (and is silent on the question of supervenience), 
or entails the falsity of Right-Description Necessity (and the falsity of superve-
nience).
First:
Simpler Utilitarianism: For all actions x in the actual world, x is right if and 
only if x maximizes happiness.
Simpler Utilitarianism is a universally quantified biconditional with no modal 
content. It says that an act in our world is right iff that act has a descriptive prop-
erty  (maximizing happiness). But Simpler Utilitarianism does not say anything 
about rightness in other possible worlds. For this reason, Simpler Utilitarianism 
implies neither Right-Description Necessity nor supervenience. It is compati-
ble with Simpler Utilitarianism that in some other possible world, actions are 
right iff they have some other descriptive property (such as minimizing utility 
or being done on a Tuesday), or that there is no descriptive predicate that is 
co-extensive with rightness in that world. Because Simpler Utilitarianism is not 
reduction friendly, it does not imply Right-Description Necessity, and Streum-
er’s argument does not go through.12
Second, a more extreme example:
Completeness: Every logically possible distribution of rightness over de-
scriptive properties is realized in some possible world.
Completeness implies the falsity of Right-Description Necessity. Here is why. It 
is logically possible that the normative property of being a right action is co-ex-
tensive with the descriptive property of being an act done on a Tuesday; it is log-
ically possible that the normative property of being a right action is co-extensive 
with the descriptive property of being an act done on a Wednesday.
Now, consider two possible worlds that are descriptively identical, and in 
which Bart Streumer buys a cup of coffee on some Wednesday. According to 
12 But, as I will argue below, Simpler Utilitarianism is the kind of theory that makes W look 
plausible.
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Completeness, Streumer’s act of buying a coffee is wrong in one world (because 
done on Wednesday, not Tuesday), and right in the other world (because done 
on Wednesday).
So if Completeness is the correct moral theory, then Streumer’s argument 
fails, because the correct moral theory does not imply Right-Description Neces-
sity. Completeness also implies that S is false, because the two possible worlds 
are descriptively identical, but differ normatively.
These examples show how Streumer’s argument fails more generally. The 
structure of the argument is that if we assume a simple moral theory such as 
Utilitarianism, then we see that Right-Description Necessity is true, and there-
fore by appeal to N that non-reductive realism is false. Then W tells us that the 
choice of Utilitarianism played no logical role, and thus that we can drop the 
assumption of that particular moral theory, yet keep the conclusion that non-re-
ductive realism is false.
But if I am right, then the work in the argument is done not by the simplicity 
of Utilitarianism, but by its reduction friendliness. And this reduction friend-
liness does play a logical role in the argument: if the true moral theory is not 
reduction friendly, then non-reductive realism is not refuted. So the assumption 
that the true moral theory is reduction friendly cannot be dropped—and reduc-
tion friendliness implies S.
An anonymous reviewer has suggested the following ingenious response to 
my criticism: What if there is some constraint on what counts as a theory—or 
more specifically, on what counts as a moral theory? We might think that theo-
ries in general, or moral theories in particular, must be able to ground counter-
factuals, or respect universalizability, for example. If there are such constraints, 
might they rule Simpler Utilitarianism and Completeness ineligible as theories, 
let alone as moral theories, let alone as possibly correct moral theories?
Though I agree that this is the best line of response for Streumer, here is a 
general argument  that it cannot work. The response faces a dilemma.
First, suppose that there is such a constraint—for the sake of argument, a 
constraint on what counts as a moral theory. If the constraint restricts moral 
theories to the reduction-friendly (and so supervenience-implying) ones only, 
then Streumer’s argument is not independent of supervenience after all. The ar-
gument relies on a truth that all moral theories imply supervenience. It covertly 
assumes S by relying on constraints that entail S.
On the other hand, if the constraint does not restrict moral theories to the 
reduction friendly—if some non-reduction-friendly moral theory meets the 
constraint—then my earlier criticism stands. Whatever the eligible but non-re-
duction-friendly moral theory in question, substitute it for Completeness in the 
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counterexample above. Because the theory is not reduction friendly, it does not 
imply Right-Description Necessity, and Streumer’s argument does not get un-
derway.
So restricting which (moral) theories are in play does not seem to be a prom-
ising line of response.
But Streumer could say: if the correct moral theory is simple and reduction 
friendly, then it need not matter that there are other possible moral theories that 
are neither simple nor reduction friendly. We just need to assume that a simple 
and reduction-friendly theory is correct, show that Right-Description Necessity 
follows, and then use W to generalize the conclusion (that non-reductive realism 
is false) to the other moral theories, whether they are reduction friendly or not. 
To close off this line of response, I will criticize W.
3. An Error Theory for W
Streumer’s argument relies on W, which is:
W: Whether normative properties are identical to descriptive properties 
cannot depend on which first-order normative view is correct.13
I will remain neutral on what kind of dependence is at stake in W. Implicit-
ly, I have been arguing that W is false. Given some assumptions, including N, I 
showed that some first-order normative views (the reduction-friendly ones) im-
ply that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties, but some 
other first-order normative views (the non-reduction-friendly ones) either im-
ply that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties or are 
silent about the matter.
In other words, I have argued against Streumer’s claim that neither non-re-
ductive realism nor its denial “contradicts any first-order normative view at all.”14 
His master argument fails because it applies only to a restricted range of first-or-
der theories.
In this section, I will show more explicitly that W is false, and explain why it 
seems so plausible. Let us again focus on the moral. What is a first-order moral 
theory? Roughly, it will tell us
(i) which objects have which moral properties, and which descriptive 
properties these objects have.15
13 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 31.
14 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 33.
15 Compare Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 31.
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For Streumer, answering (i) simply is—conceptually—what a moral theory 
does. He defends W by claiming that whether non-reductive realism is true in-
stead
(ii) “seems to depend on the nature of [moral] properties.”16
So the argument for W is that (i) and (ii) are distinct questions; indeed, W argu-
ably simply states that they are distinct. Clearly, the plausibility of W depends on 
keeping (i) and (ii) distinct.
But if the correct criterion of property identity is N, then the distinction be-
tween them collapses. This is because (i)-type facts about whether all objects 
with moral rightness also, across all worlds, have some descriptive property can 
imply—according to N—a (ii)-type fact about the nature of moral rightness: 
whether moral rightness is identical to that descriptive property.
If the (i)-type facts in question are modally strong, and tell us about how 
moral and descriptive properties are distributed across all possible worlds, then 
they can satisfy the antecedent of N. This is just what reduction-friendly first-or-
der moral theories do, and why it is the reduction friendliness (and not the sim-
plicity) of those theories that does the work in that part of Streumer’s argument. 
W cannot be used to hold fixed (ii)-type facts about non-reductive realism while 
ranging across both reduction-friendly and non-reduction-friendly answers to 
(i). In slogan, W says that first-order theories and metaethical theories answer 
distinctive questions. But given N and modally strong first-order moral theories, 
the distinction breaks down.
There are two main ways that Streumer could rescue W. First, he could say 
that N is false: even if our first-order moral theory says that rightness is necessar-
ily co-extensive with a descriptive predicate, this does not imply anything about 
property identity. But of course then the conclusion of his argument—the fal-
sity of non-reductive realism—would not follow, because N is a crucial premise 
in that argument.
Second, he could restrict W in a way that is compatible with N:
Weak W: Whether some normative property is identical to a descriptive 
property cannot depend only on what things in this possible world have 
that normative property.
This claim is indeed plausible, and compatible with N. It says that, for example, 
whether non-reductive realism is true cannot depend only on whether Simpler 
Utilitarianism is correct. Weak W is compatible with N because the latter says 
that to imply facts about property identity, a moral theory must say something 
16 Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, 31.
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about the moral property across all possible worlds, not just this one or just a 
few of them.
But as we saw with that example, Simpler Utilitarianism is not modally 
strong enough to entail Right-Description Necessity. A first-order moral theory 
that only tells us about wrongness in this possible world is not sufficient for St-
reumer’s argument to proceed.
But why does W seem plausible, even in the presence of N? Here is my di-
agnosis. First, Weak W is very plausible, and because of that we have failed to 
notice how implausible W is, at least in the presence of N and of first-order moral 
theories that include claims about all possible worlds. Second, W itself is very 
plausible if we are not attached to N—both non-reductive realists and reductive 
realists can accept W, but not at the same time as N.17
4. Conclusion
I have argued that Streumer’s attempt at reduction without S fails. The simple 
moral theory argument might not explicitly depend on supervenience, but it 
succeeds only for reduction-friendly moral theories—and those theories entail 
the truth of supervenience.18
University of Reading
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